Collective Bargaining, Labor Arbitration and the Lawyer by Feinsinger, Nathan P.
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Volume 10 
Issue 4 Issue 4 - A Symposium on Arbitration Article 9 
6-1957 
Collective Bargaining, Labor Arbitration and the Lawyer 
Nathan P. Feinsinger 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Common Law Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Nathan P. Feinsinger, Collective Bargaining, Labor Arbitration and the Lawyer, 10 Vanderbilt Law Review 
761 (1957) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol10/iss4/9 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more 
information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, LABOR ARBITRATION
AND THE LAWYER
NATHAN P. FEINSINGER*
The role of the lawyer in labor arbitration must be appraised in
the light of his function in society generally and the unique demands
of the institution of collective bargaining, of which arbitration has
become an integral part.
The role of the lawyer generally is to assist in resolving conflicts
among individual and group interests within a framework of rules
developed by the common law or by legislation, as interpreted and
applied by courts and administrative agencies. Operating within that
framework, the lawyer advises his client whether and how he can
accomplish his immediate objective. The professional skills which
he employs include analysis and advice, negotiation with opposing
interests, drafting contracts or other documents, and advocacy before
a court or administrative agency.
In applying these skills to ordinary conflicts, the lawyer as a rule
feels no responsibility to the institution of which his client is a part-
banking, insurance, real estate and the like. He does not usually
concern himself with the impact of his advice or actions upon the
interests of his client's adversary, third parties or the public, or upon
the long range economic or social interests of his own client, such as
the possibility of losing a valuable customer or status in the community
by starting a lawsuit. There may be exceptions, as in the case of a
lawyer advising a client against filing a petition for divorce because
of his concern for the institution of marriage or for the welfare of
children who may be involved. By and large, however, the lawyer
leaves questions of institutional interests or economic or social values
unanswered, without feeling remiss in the performance of his profes-
sional obligations.
In the field of labor-management relations, likewise, the lawyer
assists in resolving conflicts of interest among individuals and groups,
including the employees, management, organized labor, and the gen-
eral public. Such conflicts, however, as well as the framework of rules
within which they must be resolved, are today highly specialized and
present unique problems calling for intelligent adaptation of the
lawyer's usual skills.
Prior to 1935, when the Wagner Act established collective bargain-
ing as our national policy, the basic issue on which the lawyer was
called to advise his client was the extent to which the union or the
employer could invoke self help to achieve or resist union recognition
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for the purposes of collective bargaining. Such conflicts were in the
main determined within the usual legal framework, through court
actions for injunctions or damages, or criminal prosecutions. Since
1935, primary emphasis has shifted to what happens after union rec-
ognition. While rules of law and the courts still play some part, a
new set of rules has been adopted, administered in the first instance
by the National Labor Relations Board. The main thrust of these
rules is to promote the institution of collective bargaining. Arbitration
is basically a part of that institution. For the proper performance of
his function in the arbitration process, therefore, the lawyer must
have a basic understanding of the nature and purposes of collective
bargaining. Recognition of this need is evidenced, for example, by
the formation some years ago of the Section on Labor Law of the
American Bar Association, which includes a Committee for Improving
the Processes of Collective Bargaining, and a Committee on Improve-
ment of Administration of Union-Management Agreements.
Collective bargaining is in essence a system of industrial self-
government effectuated through private law making by management
and organized labor jointly. Government support of collective bar-
gaining, originating in the Wagner Act and continued in the Taft-
Hartley Act of 1947, is based on the theory that self-regulation is the
method most likely in a democracy to achieve industrial peace and
stability. Nevertheless the parties are left free, with limited excep-
tions, to resort to economic force to support their respective positions
in a labor dispute.' If strikes were prohibited, Government would
have to fill the vacuum by prescribing the terms of settlement, thereby
negating the voluntaryism which is the essence of the collective
bargaining process. The risk of a strike which may succeed or fail
may therefore be regarded as an inherent element in the collective
bargaining process.
Like most systems of government, collective bargaining embraces
legislative, executive, judicial and administrative functions. The
legislative function appears most clearly in the negotiation of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement which establishes the wages, hours and
other terms and conditions of employment for a stated period. While
drafted in the form of a contract, the agreement is designed more
broadly as a code of conduct to govern the daily relations of the em-
ployees, management and the union within a plant community. The
agreement defines and allocates executive responsibility for the con-
duct of these relations, a simple example being the usual "manage-
ment" clause reserving to the employer the unilateral right to deter-
mine the schedules of production, the methods of manufacturing and
1. See §§ 7, 13, 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by
the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 STAT. 140, 151, 143, 29 U.S.C.A.
§§ 157, 163, 158(d) (1956).
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the like. The typical agreement also establishes an administrative
scheme for the handling of some or all problems arising during its
terms, usually in the form of a grievance procedure, which is in es-
sence a continuation of the collective bargaining process. Finally,
the agreement normally incorporates a private procedure to resolve
such problems-judicial in that it ends in a final and binding deter-
mination of rights and duties-in the form of an arbitration clause.
In those instances in which the lawyer is called upon to assist at the
negotiation or drafting stage, he must understand these multiple as-
pects of the collective bargaining agreement and their interrelation.
In particular, he must anticipate that post-agreement problems will
arise as to the meaning or application of the language used, as to
whether a certain dispute is covered by the language at all, and what
to do if it is not so covered. With certain exceptions, labor is free to
strike2 or perhaps to sue at law in support of its position in these
post-agreement problems. One of the main purposes of the agreement,
however, is to stabilize industrial relations for a period of time, and
strikes defeat that purpose. Court litigation is for many reasons not
suited to the constructive settlement of labor disputes. Aside from
the formality, expense and delay of such litigation, it generally leaves
a bitter taste in the mouth of the loser, who does not have the usual
recourse of terminating relations with the other. The question which
confronts the lawyer advising his client initially as to potential post-
agreement disputes, therefore, is what he can recommend as alterna-
tives to strikes or lawsuits for the peaceful settlement of such disputes.
To begin with, the lawyer should advise an agreement that any dis-
pute, regardless of its nature, must first be submitted through the
grievance procedure, so as to encourage the fullest use of collective
bargaining as the means of settlement. While opinions differ,3 a
"wide open" grievance procedure is useful not only to the employees
and the union but also to the employer, since the feeling of frustration
resulting from the bottling up of complaints of any nature tends to
impair production. The lawyer may further advise an agreement
that after the grievance procedure has been exhausted, the parties
will invoke private or public mediation, again with a view to en-
courage the maximum use of collective bargaining. If the dispute
still persists, the question is what to do next, if a strike or law suit is
to be avoided. Specifically, should such disputes be submitted to
arbitration, and if so, with what limitations, if any?
In giving advice at this point, the lawyer must consider his client's
paramount interest from the client's point of view. If his client be an
2. Ibid.
3. Compare Fairweather and Shaw, Minimizing Disputes in Labor Contract
Negotiations, 12 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 297 (1947), with Katz, Minimizing
Disputes through the Adjustment of Grievances, 12 id. at 249.
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employer whose paramount interest is in uninterrupted production
during the term of the agreement, the lawyer will keep in mind the
fact that the union is legally free to strike, unless it agrees otherwise,
over any dispute arising during the term of the agreement except,
perhaps, one involving a demand for a change in the terms and con-
ditions thereof,4 and possibly advise an arbitration clause equally
broad in scope. The client's interest in avoiding employee unrest
short of a strike may even persuade him to include the latter type of
dispute. Many employers, however, and some unions, will not agree
to arbitration of any of the terms of an agreement, even at the risk of
a strike, on the theory that by so agreeing they are surrendering their
"sovereignty," whereas they are accustomed to third party decision,
i.e., by the courts, of disputes concerning the meaning of the terms of
an agreement generally. In such cases, the agreement to arbitrate will
exclude demands for either changes in or additions to the terms of
the agreement, and will be limited to disputes over the interpretation
or application of those terms, with a provision for good measure that
the arbitrator shall not add to or modify such terms. The agreement
may be further limited by excluding certain issues, such as a dispute
over job standards, or by having it apply only to certain specified
issues.
Since arbitration is designed as a substitute for strikes, it is rea-
sonable to infer an agreement not to strike as to any dispute made
subject to arbitration, and such appears to be the law.5 The parties
are free, however, to agree either to a more restrictive or less restric-
tive no-strike clause. Thus, the parties may agree to an absolute
no-strike clause despite limited arbitration, or they may agree that
the union may strike as an alternative to arbitration or following
an award. The lawyer must therefore relate the arbitration and
no-strike clauses in his advice and drafting. The same care must be
used in relating either or both clauses to other clauses in the agree-
ment, such as the "management" clause. For example, a dispute
concerning the meaning of that clause may itself be arbitrable, but
assuming that its meaning is clear and no arbitrable issue exists, the
question may arise as to whether the union may strike to protest the
exercise of a right reserved by the management clause. It is, of course,
a matter of judgment as to whether the lawyer might not be creating
4. See § 8 (d) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 STAT. 143
(1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(d) (1956).
5. See Teamsters Union v. Mead, Inc., 230 F.2d 576 (1st Cir. 1956), appeal
dismissed, 352 U.S. 802 (1957); Construction Workers v. Haislip Co., 233 F.2d
872 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 847 (1955). A similar problem concerns
the right of the union, the employer or the employee to resort to the courts
in lieu of, or subsequent to, the grievance or arbitration procedure. To an
extent, this problem may be avoided by appropriate provisions in the agree-
ment. See Cox, Rights under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARV. L. REv. 601 (1956).
[ VOL. 10
1957] LABOR ARBITRATION AND THE LAWYER 765
more problems than he is foreclosing by attempting to close this and
similar gaps at the time of negotiating the agreement.
Enough has been said to indicate the wide choice available to the
parties as to the scope of the arbitration clause. It is of the utmost
importance that the lawyer advise his client of this latitude, and the
advantages and disadvantages of each choice, in relation to the risk of
strikes and otherwise. He may be doing a great disservice to his client
by carelessly borrowing a clause from another agreement or a collec-
tion of clauses, or by insisting on one of his own preference.
It is also important that the choice once made be drafted in the clear-
est possible terms. One of the greatest and most frequent irritants in
labor management relations is a dispute over "arbitrability" or the
arbitrator's "jurisdiction," which may lead one party to refuse to
arbitrate or to comply with an award once rendered. In such a case
the other party may be forced to strike or to seek relief in the courts,
thus defeating the main objectives of the arbitration process. The
lawyer may help to avoid such results by defining the scope of the
arbitration clause as clearly as possible in the first instance, and then
by defining the procedure for deciding disputes as to arbitrability
or jurisdiction if they should arise.
In the latter connection, lawyers may soon be confronted with the
question of how to advise their clients with reference to the proposed
Uniform Arbitration Act. By section 1, the Act applies to arbitration
agreements between employers and unions "unless otherwise provided
in the agreement," thus permitting the parties to "contract out." The
Act provides for specific performance of an agreement to arbitrate,
and for enforcing, vacating, modifying or correcting an award. One
of the grounds for vacating an award, for example, is that the arbitra-
tors "exceeded their powers." A common argument against the pro-
posed Act is that its adoption would encourage the trend towards
court resort to avoid arbitration or to defeat an award, aggravated by
the tendency of some courts to concern themselves with the merits of
the dispute. The power to "contract out" is designed to offset that
argument. The question remains as to what form of relief, if any,
would be available to a party claiming, for instance, that the agree-
ment did not authorize arbitration of the particular dispute, that the
arbitrator acted improperly in the arbitration proceedings, or that he
exceeded his authority in making a particular award.
These are types of risks which the parties do not normally intend
to assume by their agreement for "final and binding" arbitration. The
problem is not so much whether an avenue for relief should exist, but
whether relief should be available only through the courts, with the
delay and expense incidental to law trials and appeals, and, more im-
portant, the friction often engendered when a labor problem is forced
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through that route. The suggestion that the arbitrator should be
authorized to pass on his own authority begs the question, and is
wholly inapplicable to such claims as that the award was tainted by
misconduct of the arbitrator.
Assuming a need for some method of review of such questions, that
need might be supplied by an arrangement under which the parties
(1) define in advance their own grounds for review and (2) agree to
submit the questions for decision by a second arbitrator. Of course,
the decision of the reviewing arbitrator may be "wrong," but so might
the decision of a court, even after appeal. The real choice lies between
private and court review, and for parties concerned about the possible
impact of increased judicial intervention on good labor relations, a
choice of review by a second arbitrator rather than by the courts may
be worthy of consideration. If the parties wish to avoid a second pro-
ceeding, they can, in any case in which a question of arbitrability or
jurisdiction is anticipated, agree initially to a board of two or three
impartial arbitrators and thus insure a broader basis of judgment in
the first instance. Such a procedure would also minimize claims of
improper conduct or lack of due process.
The wide latitude available to the lawyer in the drafting of arbitra-
tion clauses, to meet the needs and desires of the particular parties,
has already been emphasized. The same flexibility exists as to the
form and procedure of arbitration. Here, again, it is the obligation
of the lawyer to acquaint himself with the various alternatives, to
explain to his client or to both parties the existence of those alterna-
tives and the advantages and disadvantages of each, to assist them in
making a considered choice, and to reflect that choice properly by
painstaking draftsmanship. For example, shall the agreement provide
for a "permanent" or ad hoc system of arbitration? Shall there be one
arbitrator or a board? If the latter, shall the board be "all public" or
"tripartite"? If tripartite, shall the decision be by majority vote or
left to the chairman? Who shall appoint the arbitrator, if the parties
fail to agree? Shall he be permitted or invited to mediate? Shall he
file written opinions? What limitations, if any, shall be imposed on
his authority in the making of awards? Shall he be permitted, for
example, to modify disciplinary penalties, or only to sustain or set
aside? On these and similar questions, of course, there may be a dis-
agreement between the parties, which must be resolved by collective
bargaining. But the lawyer can often help towards agreement on an
intelligent and effective choice, provided that his advice is geared to
the needs and wishes of the particular parties, rather than to a per-
sonal predilection or a random choice.
The matter of arbitration procedure has two related aspects, namely,
how the proceedings should be conducted, and how the lawyer should
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conduct himself. Considerable controversy exists over the question
as to whether arbitration is, or should be, a "judicial" procedure. It
is a judicial procedure in the sense that each party is entitled to the
basic elements of procedural due process, notably a fair hearing and
a decision based on the merits. It is not a judicial procedure in the
sense that the parties are entitled to rely on the rules of evidence,
practice and procedure, or even the formal doctrines of contract
interpretation applicable in the courts, unless, of course, the parties
have agreed otherwise. One of the purposes of arbitration, both labor
and commercial, is to avoid the technicalities of courtroom procedure,
and "legal technicalities" in general; moreover, one party or both may
not be represented by counsel, and the arbitrator himself may not be
a lawyer. The arbitrator is, or should be, selected not for his "legal
ability" but primarily for his understanding of collective bargaining,
and his fairness and good judgment. Incidentally, lawyer-arbitrators
frequently are less inclined than non-lawyers to allow "legal techni-
calities" to get in the way of a speedy and just result.
One phase of the question as to whether arbitration is a "judicial"
procedure pertains to the propriety of arbitrators attempting to
mediate or compromise a dispute. Even in court proceedings, there
is the familiar figure of the "settling judge." Moreover, mediation is
a concomitant of the growing practice of pre-trial conferences. Aside
from these comparisons, since arbitration is a private process, mainly
within the control of the parties, they can advise the arbitrator of their
preference in advance-if they can agree-or select one who by habit
or reputation follows the procedure they prefer. The arbitration
process, aside from the finality of the award, is sufficiently flexible to
accommodate varying needs and desires as to procedure, and so are
most arbitrators.
The lawyer is, or should be, concerned over how to conduct himself
in presenting an arbitration case. He will usually have had no contact
with the dispute prior to its submission to arbitration. His preparation
will normally consist of analyzing the issue, interviewing witnesses,
and composing a preliminary brief or memorandum. In some cases,
he will have visited the plant where the dispute arose, to gain per-
spective on the problem. He may or may not have become acquainted
with the principals on the other side. In either case, by the time of
the hearing, he is often regarded by the other party as the alter ego
of his client, and his conduct will often determine considerably more
than the outcome of the particular controversy. It is a truism that
the labor-management relationship, unlike that of buyer and seller,
for example, is a continuing one; regardless of how a particular dispute
is resolved, the parties will normally resume their dealings. The
manner in which the lawyer conducts his client's side of that dispute,
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while of course doing his best to win a favorable result, may have a
profound effect upon the future of the collective bargaining relation-
ship, particularly at the plant level.
At one time, a labor dispute of any character was often regarded as
an instance of class warfare, and this attitude was likely to be re-
flected in an arbitration proceeding, with or without lawyers in attend-
ance. Today, most experienced management and labor representatives
regard a labor dispute, at least one arising out of an ordinary griev-
ance, as a temporary disagreement among human beings living to-
gether in a plant community, who have chosen a simple and expedi-
tious procedure, they hope, to resolve that disagreement. Tensions
may, of course, mount as the moment for presenting the dispute for
final decision arrives. The lawyer's job is to lessen, rather than
heighten, that tension. All too often, the opposite is the case. By
the lawyer's tactics, the underlying issue becomes subordinated to a
display of courtroom forensics, minus even the usual amenities.
The lawyer's use of technical language as an irritant in arbitration
proceedings has been over-emphasized, but still may create a problem.
Many of the expressions used in legal proceedings are merely short-
cuts to stating common sense propositions, which may fairly be ap-
plied to any adversary proceeding. The lawyer can and should use
those propositions for his client's protection or advantage. He may
do so effectively and without causing resentment by translating them
into terms easily understood by a layman. For example, when Union
witness Smith testifies that Jones told him he saw Brown, the grievant,
at work when he was accused of loitering, the employer's lawyer need
not protest "hearsay"; he need only ask, "Where is Jones?" Or, if
a question pertaining to the seniority rights of the grievant or of an
employee similarly situated has been decided previously through
arbitration, the lawyer need not argue "res adjudicata" or "stare
decisis"; he can talk about the need on both sides for consistency in
contract interpretation. Examples need not be multiplied.
It appears, then, that there is a place for "law" in the procedural
sense in labor arbitration, provided the law is kept in its place.
What about substantive law? One commentator has concluded that
the arbitration process can and should be divorced from "the law"
completely.6 Another suggests that the arbitrator can and must
undertake to apply established principles of law, and so, for example,
dismiss a grievance which would require conduct the law forbids or
which would enforce an illegal contract.7 The problem has two aspects,
first, what the arbitrator should do as a matter of discretion and sec-
6. Shulman, Reason, Contract and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. Rlv.
999 (1955).
7. Cox, The Place of Law in Labor Relations, Speech before the Fifth An-
nual Meeting of the National Academy of Arbitrators (1952).
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ond, to what extent his decision may be subject to reversal by the
courts or by administrative agencies such as the National Labor Re-
lations Board. The second question is beyond the control of the
arbitrator.8 The answer to the first question may depend on the ex-
tent of the discretion given by the parties to the arbitrator. Within
those limits, he should consider, but not feel bound by, "established"
rules of law. For one thing, the rules of labor law are not always
so clear or immutable that the arbitrator may feel secure in applying
them to the particular case before him., More important, he has
been selected by the parties for the exercise of his own best judg-
ment on what is the proper decision under all the circumstances of the
case. In any given case, he should feel free to decide, on the basis of
that judgment, what weight, if any, to give to rules of law derived from
sources outside the agreement. 8
Arbitration, then, is not the practice of law, but the practice of
adjusting labor-management disputes within the framework of col-
lective bargaining. Whatever doubt may exist as to the place of law
within that framework, there is no doubt a place for the lawyer who
understands his role in the collective bargaining process. While
statistics are unavailable, the demand for the lawyer's services in
that process, including his selection as an arbitrator, seems to be in-
creasing. The cynical might say his usefulness is increasing in direct
ratio to his ability to forget he is a lawyer. More accurately, his use-
fulness grows as he absorbs the mores of collective bargaining, ap-
preciates its cooperative as well as its competitive aspects, and adjusts
his basic skills to its unique demands, thereby serving the best in-
terests of his client and demonstrating the adaptability of the legal
profession to the changing needs of society.
8. See Note, 69 HARV. L. REV. 725 (1956). For recent cases in which the
arbitrator considered NLRB rules as part of his reasoning in interpreting an
agreement, see Celanese Corp. of America, 27 LAB. ARB. 844 (1956); Braniff
Airways, Inc., 27 LAB. ARB. 892 (1956).

